Mimetic Humanism and Planetary Cohabitation – Toward an Ethics of Inclusive Transmission

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Abstract

In an age of planetary interconnection, the ethical challenges we face are no longer only local, deliberative, or individual. They are transmissive. The values we repeat, suppress, or circulate across borders now shape global moral conditions, influencing what becomes visible, imitable, and viable within shared cultural space. This article introduces the concept of mimetic humanism, a transmission-aware ethical orientation rooted in the Networked Mimetic Ethics (NME) framework. Mimetic humanism centres the right to ethical visibility, the dignity of value plurality, and the moral responsibility to curate shared spaces of transmission. Against the backdrop of cultural erasure, digital colonialism, and algorithmic homogenisation, the article argues for a renewed approach to ethical cohabitation, one that treats transmission not as a by-product of culture, but as its central ethical medium. Through critical analysis of global infrastructures, borderless platforms, and the dynamics of mimetic exclusion, the paper outlines a theory of inclusive contagion and proposes principles for designing systems that sustain ethical diversity at scale. It concludes that planetary ethics must be built not only on the capacity to live

together, but on the capacity to transmit together, to co-shape the mimetic conditions through which our moral futures unfold.

Keywords: mimetic ethics, planetary cohabitation, decolonial philosophy, cultural transmission, ethical pluralism.

The Ethics of Shared Transmission

To live in the twenty-first century is to live in an entangled field of repetition. Values, images, behaviours, slogans, rituals, each now circulates at a speed and scale previously unthinkable. This is not merely a shift in technology or culture. It is a shift in the mimetic architecture of human life. The boundaries that once structured the transmission of moral meaning, geographical, linguistic, institutional, have thinned. In their place emerges a shared mimetic field, where acts of expression ripple across continents, and inherited values are exposed to new publics, systems, and systems of interpretation. In this context, ethical life is no longer only about what one believes or how one acts. It is about what one transmits, receives, and shares. Ethics has become a problem of cohabitation in transmission.

This article introduces *mimetic humanism* as an ethical response to this condition. Where classical humanism centred rational agency and autonomous dignity, mimetic humanism centres transmission, visibility, and relationality as the conditions of ethical life. It begins from the premise, foundational to *Networked Mimetic Ethics* (NME), that moral meaning is not static but contagious, that it spreads through visibility, imitation, and social patterning (James, 2024). In this view, to act ethically is not only to reflect or decide, but to participate in shaping the

conditions under which others see, imitate, and inherit values. Transmission, then, is not a neutral function of culture. It is an ethical act, embedded in power, design, and historical asymmetry.

The ethical stakes of shared transmission are especially acute in the context of globalisation. The erosion of spatial and temporal boundaries has brought disparate cultures, identities, and normative frameworks into close proximity. Yet this proximity has not guaranteed mutual recognition or mimetic equality. Instead, it has often resulted in cultural flattening, algorithmic suppression, or epistemic domination, where some values travel effortlessly while others are silenced, exoticised, or lost in translation (Spivak, 1988; Alcoff, 2007). The conditions under which values are transmitted are structured by asymmetries of infrastructure, language, visibility, and platform governance. These asymmetries do not merely shape who gets heard. They shape who gets mimicked, and who is allowed to become a moral reference point in the global mimetic field.

To speak of *shared transmission* is to foreground these dynamics as ethically significant. It is to ask: Whose values are rendered transmissible, and through what systems? Who benefits from the circulation of their ethical worldviews? Who is algorithmically erased or made mimetically illegible? And how do design decisions, whether in educational policy, content moderation, or AI training data, shape the future of moral contagion? These questions require moving beyond liberal ideals of mutual tolerance or multicultural coexistence. They demand a mimetic ethics of cohabitation, in which the right to participate in the shaping of shared moral reality is treated as a matter of justice.

Historically, the concept of ethical coexistence has been structured through models of sovereign pluralism. Each community, it was assumed, would be free to live according to its own values, bounded by territorial or institutional limits. But in an age of digital convergence and mediated interdependence, this model is no longer tenable. Values do not stay in place. They move, across borders, platforms, and identities, creating contagion effects that cannot be neatly contained within traditional political or cultural units (Appadurai, 1996; Beck, 2000). What is needed is a framework that treats this transmission across difference not as a problem to be suppressed, but as a site of ethical responsibility.

Mimetic humanism offers such a framework. It begins by recognising that all ethical life is interdependent. No value is born in isolation. Each is shaped by a mimetic ecology of parents, teachers, peers, media, symbols, and technologies. This interdependence is not a weakness but a feature. It means that the transmission of values is always a shared process. What I learn, I may teach. What I express, another may imitate. The question is not whether we influence one another, but how responsibly we structure the terms of that influence.

This responsibility includes not only what one chooses to say, but what one chooses to transmit, platform, repeat, or suppress. In a mimetic system, silence is not neutral. It may serve to protect, but it can also erase. Likewise, amplification is not always benevolent. It may celebrate, but it may also distort, appropriate, or decontextualise. Mimetic humanism insists that to share in transmission is to share in the shaping of moral possibility. Ethical responsibility therefore extends to the design and governance of transmissive systems.

From this perspective, platform design becomes moral design. Content curation becomes ethical gatekeeping. Educational curricula become vectors of ethical inheritance. AI training data

becomes a mimetic archive, encoding which values and ways of knowing will be legible to future systems. Each of these domains participates in what we might call the transmissive commons: the shared space in which moral meaning is circulated and inherited.

Mimetic humanism calls for stewardship of this commons. It affirms that ethical cohabitation in a globalised, digital world is not just about tolerating difference, but building infrastructures that allow difference to transmit, to be seen, heard, repeated, and reinterpreted with integrity. This is not a call for relativism or uncritical pluralism. It is a call for transmission justice: a recognition that the capacity to shape the moral field is not equally distributed, and that those systems that structure imitation must be held to account.

In practical terms, this means designing platforms that resist algorithmic monoculture, supporting education systems that expose students to global ethical traditions, funding cultural institutions that preserve endangered moral vocabularies, and ensuring that the development of AI and other emergent technologies includes diverse communities in decisions about what is learned, remembered, or forgotten. It means treating ethical visibility as a right, not a privilege, a precondition for participation in the shaping of shared futures.

Mimetic humanism also demands a shift in how we conceptualise harm. In mimetic systems, harm is not only caused by action or omission. It is also caused by transmissive distortion, when values are misrepresented, commodified, or repeated in ways that betray their original ethical function. Protecting against such harm requires attentiveness not only to content but to form, repetition, and resonance. It requires designing systems that can recognise and preserve the ethical textures of the values they transmit.

To conclude this section: the ethics of shared transmission begins with a simple but radical insight, that what we pass on matters. It matters not only because it reflects who we are, but because it shapes who others become. In a world where mimetic contagion is continuous, borderless, and technologically mediated, we must rethink ethical responsibility as a function of transmissive participation. Mimetic humanism offers the principles and vocabulary to undertake this rethinking.

The sections that follow explore the implications of this view across different domains: cultural erasure and mimetic exclusion, ethical nationalism, digital infrastructures, and the contested right to transmit. Together, they outline a theory of planetary cohabitation grounded in inclusive transmission, an ethics for a shared world, shaped by shared contagion.

Mimetic Exclusion and the Ethics of Silence

To be human is not merely to possess reason or rights, but to be capable of shaping the moral world through expression, imitation, and transmission. Yet not all are granted equal access to this capacity. Across history and into the digital present, countless individuals, cultures, and communities have been denied the means to transmit their ethical visions. This is not merely an epistemic loss. It is a mimetic injustice. The right to ethical visibility, to be part of the transmission field that constitutes shared life, is increasingly central to what it means to be human. Mimetic humanism begins here: with the recognition that to silence a culture's transmission is to cut it off from moral futurity.

Within the *Networked Mimetic Ethics* (NME) framework, mimetic exclusion refers to the structural denial of transmissive capacity, the suppression of a people's ability to participate in

shaping what becomes visible, imitable, and morally relevant. Mimetic exclusion is distinct from censorship. It is often more subtle. It operates through infrastructural absence, aesthetic devaluation, linguistic dominance, economic marginalisation, and algorithmic filtering. The result is not simply that certain values are not heard. It is that they are rendered unrepeatable within the dominant mimetic field.

This exclusion has deep historical roots. Colonial projects, for instance, did not only extract resources and subjugate populations; they also systematically disrupted indigenous systems of transmission. Languages were criminalised or erased, ritual practices outlawed, oral traditions discredited, and epistemologies dismissed as superstition or myth (Ngũgĩ, 1986; Santos, 2014). The objective was not merely to dominate, but to replace the transmissive substrate of colonised societies with forms more amenable to imperial mimicry. Even after political independence, many postcolonial states continue to grapple with the aftershocks of this disruption, cultural fragmentation, mimetic dependency, and the internalisation of ethical inferiority.

In settler-colonial contexts, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, mimetic exclusion was often paired with forcible assimilation. Indigenous children were removed from families and placed in residential schools designed to replace their moral lifeworlds with dominant cultural codes (Smith, 1999). These interventions were not framed as violence, but as civilising missions. Yet their legacy is one of profound ethical disinheritance, the destruction of transmission chains that once carried values, knowledge, and identity across generations.

Linguistic extinction is perhaps the most literal expression of mimetic exclusion. Every language that disappears takes with it a unique ethical grammar, a way of relating to the world,

others, and the self. As Crystal (2000) notes, languages encode not just information but moral cosmologies, systems of obligation, gratitude, kinship, and care. Their loss is not merely a communicative deficit; it is a mimetic erasure, a shrinking of the space of ethical imagination. The silence that follows is not empty. It is structured by power.

Contemporary forms of mimetic exclusion often operate through digital infrastructures. Search engines, content moderation algorithms, platform recommendation systems, all shape what values gain traction in the global transmission economy. Yet these systems are disproportionately trained on high-volume, high-engagement data from dominant cultural centres. As a result, minority languages, subaltern epistemologies, and marginalised moral perspectives are systematically underrepresented, misclassified, or rendered illegible to machine interpretation (Birhane, 2021; Bender et al., 2021). In a world increasingly mediated by artificial systems, to be mimetically unreadable is to risk ethical invisibility.

Moreover, digital platforms often reinforce mimetic hierarchies by promoting normative styles of ethical expression, concise, emotive, binary, and aligned with dominant cultural references. Values that require nuance, context, or unfamiliar symbolic frameworks struggle to survive in such environments. They are not rejected outright, but they fail to compete for repetition. Mimetic exclusion here is not imposed. It is algorithmically inferred.

This is where the ethics of silence becomes central. Silence is not only the absence of speech. It is often the result of design, omission, or structural deafness. As Spivak (1988) famously asked, "Can the subaltern speak?", but more pointedly, can the subaltern be repeated? Can their moral voice enter the mimetic loop that constitutes public ethical life? In many cases,

the answer remains no, not because of malicious intent, but because systems have not been designed to hear them.

Mimetic humanism insists that ethical dignity requires transmissive capacity. This is not simply the freedom to express a value, but the structural conditions under which that value can be seen, heard, repeated, and contextualised. A society may formally protect free speech yet still deny mimetic access to many. True ethical inclusion demands more: the cultivation of plural infrastructures of visibility, and the protection of diverse mimetic lifelines.

This recognition has implications for global governance, education, platform design, and the ethics of development. It suggests that transmission equity must be a central concern in cultural funding, AI dataset construction, curriculum design, and digital infrastructure deployment. To include marginalised voices is not merely to invite them to speak, but to build systems in which their transmission is viable.

Practices of mimetic restitution, efforts to restore interrupted lines of ethical inheritance, are one such response. These include the revitalisation of indigenous languages, the repatriation of stolen cultural artefacts, the restitution of land and ritual space, and the funding of cultural institutions by and for communities historically denied their mimetic autonomy. Yet restitution is not enough without transformation of the systems that created exclusion in the first place.

There is also a role for what might be called mimetic listening: the deliberate act of attending to ethical expressions that do not conform to dominant styles of articulation. This is not simply cultural appreciation or diversity training. It is an epistemic practice of attuning oneself to difference, of developing the patience and humility to follow unfamiliar moral rhythms. Mimetic

listening is necessary not only for solidarity, but for building the foundations of ethical cohabitation in a world that is both interconnected and deeply unequal.

Finally, silence must be understood not only as exclusion, but as trauma. Many communities carry memories of repression so deep that transmission itself becomes painful. The act of speaking, of passing on, is haunted by risk. Mimetic humanism must therefore be attentive to the fragility of ethical inheritance, and the ways in which silence can be both a wound and a protection. Supporting such communities requires more than amplification. It requires care, consent, and an ethics of witness that respects the temporality of healing.

To conclude: mimetic exclusion is not peripheral to ethical theory. It is foundational. Who is allowed to transmit, whose values are repeated, recognised, and inherited, is a question of moral ontology. Mimetic humanism demands that we treat this question with the seriousness it deserves. The ethics of cohabitation cannot rest on abstract principles. It must engage with the material, infrastructural, and historical conditions that shape who gets to participate in shaping the world.

Transmission Without Borders – A Critique of Ethical Nationalism

In political theory, the concept of sovereignty has long been tied to the moral authority of the state. Whether expressed through constitutions, legal systems, or national traditions, ethical legitimacy is often imagined as rooted in bounded territories, specific to peoples, cultures, or histories, and protected from external interference. Yet in a world where values are transmitted instantly across borders, platforms, and communities, this model is increasingly inadequate. The circulation of norms, behaviours, and moral paradigms now transcends political boundaries with

little regard for national jurisdictions or cultural sovereignty. This section argues that ethical nationalism, the attempt to confine moral legitimacy within the borders of the nation-state, is no longer viable in a world defined by mimetic fluidity.

Drawing from the *Networked Mimetic Ethics* (NME) framework, we can say that transmission now outpaces governance. Moral content, whether in the form of protest strategies, religious movements, gender norms, or aesthetic values, is disseminated through systems that are planetary in reach but uneven in design. These transmissions are not merely informational. They are mimetic: they shape how people act, aspire, and imagine the good. What is at stake, then, is not just cultural diffusion, but the redistribution of ethical influence.

Yet the dominant response from many states has been to reassert the logic of ethical enclosure. This often takes the form of culture-protection laws, digital firewalls, curriculum nationalism, or media bans intended to insulate the population from "foreign values." Such policies are typically justified in the name of sovereignty, tradition, or identity. But from a mimetic perspective, they represent an attempt to police the field of ethical repetition, to restrict which models of life are visible, which behaviours are imitable, and whose moral visions can circulate within a given population.

The ethics of such restrictions is far from neutral. As Beck (2006) notes, nationalism is no longer an inward-looking phenomenon; it is increasingly reactive, aimed at controlling the transnational flows of culture and ethics. In this regard, ethical nationalism is not about preserving culture, but about controlling transmissibility. It operates by suppressing contagion, interrupting mimetic circuits that might destabilise dominant norms or introduce plural ethical grammars into the public domain.

This is not merely a concern for authoritarian states. Even liberal democracies often deploy soft forms of ethical nationalism through content regulation, curriculum design, and cultural funding mechanisms. These structures tend to centre dominant historical narratives, marginalise dissenting traditions, and promote national myths as the standard for moral instruction. The result is a sanctioned monoculture, presented as pluralism, but functionally mimetically exclusive.

Mimetic humanism challenges this logic at its core. It insists that values do not belong to nations, nor can they be legitimately confined to them. While historical and cultural specificity are real, the dynamics of transmission mean that values are always already in motion, always implicated in circuits of imitation that exceed the nation-state. What matters ethically is not where a value originated, but how it spreads, what it enables, and whom it excludes.

This position may appear to echo cosmopolitanism, but it differs in one crucial respect. Where cosmopolitan theories often frame ethics in terms of universal reason or human rights, mimetic humanism focuses on plural ethical transmission. It recognises that moral meaning is not universal in content, but structurally universal in form, we all imitate, learn, and pass on. The question is whether systems are structured to allow reciprocal co-transmission, or whether they concentrate visibility and influence in a few powerful nodes.

Indeed, the challenge of borderless transmission is not that it undermines ethical localism, but that it does so unevenly. The internet does not produce equal exposure. Its infrastructures disproportionately reflect the values, languages, and norms of dominant geopolitical actors, especially the Global North. As Couldry and Mejias (2019) have argued, the digital environment is structured by data colonialism, where the ethical expressions of many are extracted,

reformulated, or ignored in service of dominant mimetic flows. Ethical nationalism, in this context, is both a reaction to and a symptom of this imbalance.

What is needed is neither the reassertion of national ethical boundaries nor a naïve embrace of global ethical homogenisation. Instead, mimetic humanism proposes the cultivation of mimetic plurality without territorial enclosure. This means recognising that values will circulate, but that the conditions of their circulation must be made just, inclusive, and accountable. It also means fostering transmission reciprocity, ensuring that marginalised ethical traditions are not only visible within dominant cultures, but are allowed to influence, reshape, and contest them on equal terms.

Practically, this implies supporting multilingual platforms, funding transnational cultural exchange that is not extractive, regulating AI systems to ensure dataset diversity, and developing educational approaches that teach ethical inheritance as transmission across difference, not just tradition within boundaries. It also means resisting the rhetoric of "our values" when used to deny the ethical legitimacy of others' transmissive claims.

The ethics of borderless transmission also reshapes our understanding of responsibility. If a government blocks access to external ethical content, it is not simply protecting its culture. It is denying its citizens access to the full mimetic field, constraining their moral development by limiting what they can see and repeat. Likewise, when a tech company trains its AI systems on data that excludes certain languages or epistemologies, it is not merely making a technical decision. It is structuring the mimetic future of moral life, determining who and what will be intelligible to machines and to each other.

Mimetic humanism offers a conceptual lens to understand these dynamics not as secondary policy questions, but as primary ethical challenges. In a world where values cannot be quarantined and imitation is ambient, designing for transmission justice becomes as vital as protecting rights or distributing resources. Ethical cohabitation, in this view, is not grounded in territorial co-existence, but in shared transmissive exposure, the mutual shaping of moral life across systems and scales.

To conclude, ethical nationalism is not only obsolete; it is increasingly unethical. It denies the relational nature of moral meaning, misconstrues the nature of influence in the digital age, and restricts the ethical agency of those within and beyond the nation-state. Transmission, like air, cannot be confined without distortion. Mimetic humanism therefore proposes a different model: one in which values travel, transform, and contest one another within infrastructures that support dignity, plurality, and shared mimetic responsibility.

Dignity, Contagion, and the Right to Be Repeated

To be ethical in the modern world is not only to hold convictions or behave according to norms. It is to be part of a transmissive circuit, to pass on values, to have one's expressions repeatable, recognisable, and mimetically viable. Yet this capacity is not evenly distributed. Some values, voices, and communities possess the conditions for repetition: access to infrastructure, cultural legitimacy, linguistic dominance, and systemic amplification. Others do not. The result is not just exclusion from dialogue, but exclusion from ethical reproduction. This section argues that the right to be repeated, to have one's moral frameworks visibly circulate and be carried forward, is not ancillary to dignity. It is integral to it.

Within the *Networked Mimetic Ethics* (NME) framework, ethical dignity is reframed not as static autonomy or inner worth, but as transmissive potential: the capacity of an individual or community to participate in shaping the moral field through repetition, resonance, and influence. Dignity, in this view, is not simply a matter of not being violated. It is a matter of being imitable under conditions of respect and fidelity. To be denied this is to be denied a future.

Traditional accounts of human dignity, whether Kantian, theological, or rights-based, have focused on the inviolability of persons and the universal applicability of reason (Kant, 1998; Donnelly, 2003). These frameworks remain valuable but are increasingly strained in the context of mimetic systems. The question today is not only whether one is free to speak or believe, but whether one's expressions can enter the loop of cultural transmission, be repeated without distortion, and persist across time. Mimetic humanism introduces this dimension explicitly. It treats moral contagion as a human good, something to which all are entitled, and which must be defended against erasure, appropriation, or algorithmic marginalisation.

This is particularly relevant in the context of global media systems, where certain cultural or ethical expressions are extracted, commodified, and repeated out of context while others are ignored altogether. The appropriation of indigenous symbols in fashion, the viralisation of decontextualised protest images, the replication of spiritual practices stripped of history, these are not merely aesthetic phenomena. They are mimetic distortions. They replicate without fidelity. And in doing so, they often override the originating communities' own terms of transmission.

The ethics of repetition thus hinges on two principles: the right to transmit and the right to control how transmission occurs. The first asserts that communities must have access to the

systems and conditions that allow their values to be circulated and recognised. This includes technological access, linguistic inclusion, and narrative legitimacy. The second affirms that repetition must be ethical in form: it must honour the intention, context, and integrity of what is being transmitted. Without this, repetition becomes a form of cultural misrepresentation, even if well-intentioned.

Consider the example of religious rituals filmed for global audiences without contextual understanding. The act may spread awareness, but it can also result in caricature, spiritual dislocation, or mimetic trivialisation. What is repeated is not the value itself but its surface, its aesthetic, its meme. Mimetic dignity requires more. It demands depth of transmission, the ability to be repeated in ways that preserve meaning, nuance, and respect.

At the same time, repetition is not inherently virtuous. Values can be transmitted maliciously. Hate speech, supremacist ideologies, dehumanising stereotypes, these too can go viral. What mimetic humanism affirms is not the uncritical right to transmit anything, but the right to ethical reproduction under conditions of mutual responsibility. This requires systems that can distinguish between repetition that affirms dignity and that which corrodes it. It also requires cultures that understand moral influence as a shared obligation, not merely a right.

From a policy perspective, this means recognising transmissibility as a site of justice. Who gets repeated, who is visible in curricula, whose values are embedded in AI systems, whose stories are eligible for funding, translation, or citation, these are not peripheral concerns. They are core to how dignity is distributed. It also means protecting communities from the unauthorised mimicry of their ethical traditions, especially when such mimicry results in distortion, mockery, or commercial exploitation.

Digital systems play a crucial role in shaping this landscape. As Bender et al. (2021) and Noble (2018) have shown, algorithmic infrastructures tend to amplify content that aligns with dominant cultural norms, while suppressing expressions that lack commercial traction or deviate from learned patterns. In this context, a value may be *true*, *ethical*, and *generative*, and still fail to repeat. The problem is not in the speaker, but in the structure of transmissibility.

Mimetic dignity therefore includes a right to algorithmic visibility, to have one's values accessible, repeatable, and contextually understood within digital systems. This does not mean demanding equality of outcome. Not all values will gain equal traction. But it does mean demanding equality of conditions, the right to participate in the shaping of what is transmissible, rather than being passively indexed by systems built without you in mind.

The notion of the "right to be repeated" also intersects with broader human rights discourses, particularly cultural rights and the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain, control, and transmit their heritage. As articulated in the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP, 2007), the ability to preserve, practise, and develop cultural traditions is central to collective dignity. Mimetic humanism extends this into the realm of transmissive equity, linking cultural rights with the ethical design of media, education, and technological systems.

But the ethical core of this argument lies not in law, but in relational philosophy. To deny someone the ability to transmit is to deny them a future audience. It is to sever their connection to ethical posterity. Just as archives give weight to historical narratives, and ritual gives life to memory, transmission gives continuity to moral worlds. A community that cannot transmit is a

community held in stasis. A people that cannot be repeated is a people rendered ethically inert in the public imagination.

In sum, mimetic dignity is grounded in the right to ethical reproduction, the right to be repeated with integrity, to influence the moral field, to persist in the world through values that are neither erased nor misappropriated. Mimetic humanism holds that this is not a luxury. It is a condition of ethical cohabitation in a shared, transmissive world.

Ethical Cohabitation and Mimetic Pluralism

The modern world is defined not by the absence of values, but by their simultaneity. Religious doctrines, secular ethics, indigenous moral cosmologies, liberal principles, and algorithmically mediated behavioural norms all coexist, often within the same spaces, institutions, and platforms. This plurality is not merely a backdrop. It is a mimetic condition. People absorb, imitate, and re-perform values from multiple, sometimes contradictory sources. In this context, ethical life is no longer defined by singular allegiance, but by navigation, the ability to coexist with, respond to, and sometimes reconcile overlapping value systems.

Mimetic humanism recognises this condition not as a problem to be resolved, but as a fact to be designed for. If transmission is the medium through which values persist and transform, then ethical cohabitation must be understood as mimetic pluralism: the structuring of transmissive space in a way that sustains diversity without fragmentation or domination. This section outlines what it means to live amid competing mimetic systems, and how that coexistence can be made not only bearable, but generative.

Traditionally, pluralism has been framed in political or legal terms: the protection of multiple belief systems, the balancing of freedoms, or the toleration of dissent. But these models presume that values remain bounded and inert, coexisting like sovereign territories. In contrast, mimetic pluralism begins from the premise that values interact, mutate, and infect. They are not quarantined but shared, borrowed, hybridised, and contested. The challenge is not just to allow coexistence, but to design systems that can hold difference in motion.

Ethical cohabitation in this framework involves three primary components: visibility, structural reciprocity, and mimetic integrity.

Visibility

The first condition of cohabitation is that all values must have the possibility of being seen and repeated. This does not mean that every tradition, worldview, or expression must be amplified equally. But it does mean that systems should not systematically erase, marginalise, or make some moral forms illegible. Visibility is the entry point to mimetic influence. A value that cannot be seen cannot be mimicked, debated, or transformed. In this sense, epistemic presence is a moral prerequisite.

In practice, this means designing infrastructures, educational, digital, legal, cultural, that enable multiple ethical grammars to surface. Curriculum reform, platform transparency, multilingual access, and cultural funding diversity are all forms of visibility engineering. These efforts ensure that pluralism is not merely formal but experiential: people actually encounter values different from their own and have the opportunity to engage with them in their full ethical context.

Structural Reciprocity

Visibility alone is insufficient. Pluralism also requires reciprocal transmissive structures, conditions under which values can influence one another on relatively equal terms. Too often, what is called pluralism is actually a form of hierarchical inclusion: minority values are tolerated but denied the ability to reshape the dominant frame. True cohabitation means that transmissive power is shared, that values not only exist side by side but can enter into mutual reconfiguration.

This demands attention to the material and infrastructural basis of value transmission. Who owns the platforms? Who trains the algorithms? Whose languages are supported? Whose data is used to build models? Whose examples are taught in ethics classrooms or encoded in legal precedent? These are not neutral questions. They shape what kinds of moral life are reproducible within the shared mimetic field.

Structural reciprocity also involves protection against mimetic displacement, when dominant values co-opt or override others under the guise of universality. Cultural appropriation, spiritual commodification, and algorithmic normativity all represent such displacement. Systems must be designed to enable influence without erasure, transformation without dominance.

Mimetic Integrity

Finally, ethical cohabitation requires a commitment to mimetic integrity, the idea that values, when repeated, should retain their ethical coherence and contextual depth. This does not mean freezing traditions in place or preventing reinterpretation. It means cultivating a culture of respectful repetition, in which values are transmitted with attentiveness to origin, meaning, and resonance.

This is especially crucial in a digital environment, where values are often transmitted in fragmented, aestheticised, or memetic form. Mimetic pluralism calls for platforms that support context-rich transmission, and for public discourse that distinguishes between representation and reproduction, between invoking a value and living it.

Ethical cohabitation, then, is not the absence of conflict. It is the design of disagreement spaces that can hold multiple ethical realities without forcing assimilation or retreat. In this sense, mimetic pluralism builds on the work of deliberative theorists like Habermas (1996), but goes further: it attends not only to procedures of discourse, but to the infrastructures of contagion, the systems through which values travel and are taken up.

Mimetic pluralism also has implications for personal identity. In a world of intersecting transmissions, people no longer inherit singular moral frameworks. They become transmissive composites, shaped by overlapping mimetic exposures, simultaneously subject to multiple ethical forces. Mimetic humanism does not view this as fragmentation. It views it as a condition of postmodern ethical formation: we are not morally divided, but transmissively multiplied. Ethical agency lies in learning to curate one's own mimetic environment, to choose not only what to believe, but what to pass on.

Practically, this means cultivating ethical reflexivity: the capacity to interrogate the origins, logics, and consequences of the values we repeat. It also requires institutional support: from schools that teach moral formation as an evolving, collective project, to platforms that allow users to trace the mimetic lineage of what they see and share.

The ultimate aim of mimetic pluralism is not harmony but co-generativity, a condition in which ethical difference is not only tolerated, but enables new value formations to emerge. Just

as biodiversity strengthens ecosystems, ethical diversity strengthens collective resilience. Systems that suppress pluralism become brittle. Systems that support plural transmission become morally adaptive.

To conclude: ethical cohabitation in a networked world is not simply about peace or tolerance. It is about shared stewardship of the mimetic commons, the spaces, systems, and rhythms through which values are passed on. Mimetic pluralism offers a framework for navigating this challenge, insisting that coexistence is not merely the absence of conflict but the presence of designed transmissive equity.

In a time when mimicry is ambient, global, and largely unreflective, the task is clear. We must learn not only to live together, but to transmit together, to design lives, platforms, and institutions that make space for the values of others to live, breathe, and repeat.

Technics and Transmission at Scale

The transmission of values is no longer solely a human affair. It is mediated, accelerated, and increasingly governed by technics, by platforms, protocols, algorithms, and infrastructures that shape what can be seen, shared, and repeated. These systems do not operate neutrally. They embed assumptions about relevance, coherence, and engagement that determine which values gain traction in the public sphere. In a world structured by large-scale technical mediation, ethical cohabitation is not merely a cultural challenge. It is an architectural one. This section examines how technics governs the mimetic field, and how *Networked Mimetic Ethics* (NME) reorients our ethical attention toward the design of transmission environments at scale.

The core insight is simple but profound: transmission is infrastructural. What appears as moral influence, a value going viral, an idea gaining currency, a belief system spreading, is often the result of decisions made in code, architecture, or business logic. These decisions structure what counts as content, how it is ranked, how long it persists, and who is allowed to see or respond to it. In this sense, ethical contagion has become computationally shaped, not only by human desire but by engineered patterns of visibility.

Algorithmic recommendation systems exemplify this phenomenon. Whether on YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, or Spotify, such systems curate a user's mimetic environment based on predictive models of attention and similarity. These models are trained on behavioural data, often derived from past engagement rather than moral depth. As a result, they privilege values that are aesthetically legible, emotionally reactive, and algorithmically familiar. Nuance, context, and cultural specificity become liabilities in the transmissive economy.

This has profound ethical implications. The system does not ask what values are just, or wise, or culturally significant. It asks what values keep people watching. The result is not merely cultural flattening, but ethical compression, the reduction of complex moral frameworks to repeatable, consumable fragments. Mimetic transmission becomes a function of platform affordances, producing what Braidotti (2013) calls *algorithmic normativity*: a regime in which behavioural repetition is shaped more by machine logics than by deliberation or relational understanding.

Within the NME framework, this condition is understood as technically mediated mimesis: a state in which values are not only transmitted through people, but through protocols, through the invisible logics of filtering, sorting, and signalling. This shift does not mean that

human agency disappears. But it does mean that ethical agency is increasingly co-produced by systems we do not control, and often do not understand.

Consider the example of language models. Systems such as GPT, Claude, or other generative AIs are trained on massive corpora scraped from the web, books, and public data. The values they reproduce are drawn from this training data, but they are not contextually aware. They remix existing moral patterns, amplifying dominant perspectives and obscuring marginal ones. Unless their training is curated with deliberate attention to transmissive equity, they risk replicating historical biases and reinforcing mimetic exclusion.

This is why mimetic humanism demands a shift in how we approach AI ethics and infrastructure governance. It is not enough to ask whether a system is fair, explainable, or robust. We must ask: what does this system repeat? Whose values are encoded? What mimetic futures are being made viable, and for whom? These are not just technical questions. They are questions of cultural justice and ethical cohabitation.

At the same time, technics does not only distort. It also enables. Digital infrastructures have allowed marginalised voices to reach global audiences, enabled the preservation of endangered traditions, and created new forms of moral expression. Activist networks, educational platforms, and digital archives demonstrate that scale is not the enemy of pluralism, but only when systems are designed to support it.

What differentiates ethical technics from oppressive technics is not intent but design logic. Ethical technics enables mimetic plurality, designing for diversity of uptake, resistance to centralisation, and support for minority transmission chains. It ensures that systems do not

collapse all value into one transmissive model, viral, immediate, emotive, but sustain multiple registers of repetition, including slow, deliberative, or locally bound forms.

This requires a set of design principles aligned with NME:

1. Transmissive Transparency – Systems must make visible how values are prioritised, repeated, or suppressed. Users should be able to trace why they see what they see and how mimetic influence is being structured.

2. Contextual Fidelity – Platforms and models must support the ethical context of transmitted content, preventing fragmentation that distorts meaning.

3. Algorithmic Pluralism – Recommendation engines should be designed to enable exposure to diverse ethical frameworks, not merely personalised echo chambers.

4. Distributed Archiving – Ethical transmission must include mechanisms for persistence, ensuring that traditions and expressions are not erased by platform turnover or data rot.

5. Participatory Curation – Communities should be empowered to shape how their values are represented and transmitted in technical systems.

These principles do not eliminate conflict or guarantee justice. But they open the space for designed cohabitation, for systems that recognise their role in shaping mimetic life and take responsibility for its contours.

Crucially, technics at scale also requires governance at scale. The infrastructure of ethical life is no longer confined to national borders or local communities. It is planetary. This calls for new forms of institutional collaboration, regulation, and cultural diplomacy focused not just on

cybersecurity or misinformation, but on moral transmission infrastructures. UNESCO's work on cultural diversity and digital heritage offers one model, but broader institutional frameworks are needed, ones that centre the ethics of contagion, not merely the ethics of content.

To conclude: technics is not a neutral tool. It is a mimetic condition, a force that shapes who gets repeated, what becomes visible, and how moral worlds unfold. The ethics of cohabitation today depends on whether our infrastructures are designed to support shared, plural, and just transmission, or whether they reinforce dominance, erasure, and monoculture. Mimetic humanism provides the conceptual lens to recognise this dynamic, and the normative tools to act upon it. The question is no longer whether ethics can scale. It is whether transmission can be designed to carry dignity across that scale.

Conclusion – Mimetic Humanism as Planetary Ethics

To live ethically in the twenty-first century is to live in a world where values do not stay still. They circulate, mutate, and embed themselves in lives far beyond those who first uttered them. This condition is not a metaphor. It is structural. We live amid an unceasing flow of repetition, where beliefs are retweeted, rituals livestreamed, moral judgments automated, and cultural expressions scraped into datasets. Ethical life, in this context, cannot be understood solely in terms of intention, consequence, or character. It must also be understood as transmission, as the shaping of what others inherit, imitate, and internalise.

This article has introduced mimetic humanism as a normative response to this condition: a philosophy that places ethical weight not only on what one believes, but on what one enables to

be transmitted. It reframes dignity as a function of transmissive viability. It treats exclusion not only as marginalisation, but as mimetic erasure. And it positions justice not as an abstract distribution of rights, but as the structuring of shared contagion, the ability to co-shape what is repeatable within the mimetic architectures of culture, infrastructure, and code.

Mimetic humanism does not abandon classical humanist concerns, freedom, rationality, self-expression, but it reorients them. It insists that freedom is only meaningful when one's values can circulate with integrity. That rationality is shaped not only by deliberation but by exposure. That self-expression, to matter ethically, must exist within systems that allow others to hear, repeat, and respond.

At the heart of this ethics lies the claim that transmissive justice is planetary justice. In a globalised, algorithmically mediated world, the conditions that govern repetition are no longer local or self-contained. They are built into infrastructures that span continents. Platform governance in Silicon Valley shapes the visibility of political resistance in Lagos. Curriculum reform in São Paulo can inspire educators in Helsinki. A cultural trope from Seoul may reappear as a moral reference in Johannesburg. Transmission exceeds origin.

In such a world, ethical responsibility cannot end at one's own borders, disciplines, or communities. It must expand to include the systems that carry values across space and time. Mimetic humanism calls on leaders, designers, educators, developers, and institutions to recognise their role not merely as managers of culture, but as custodians of transmission. The question is no longer: What do we believe? It is: What are we making repeatable?

This article has explored this question across seven dimensions:

- In Section 1, we introduced the ethics of shared transmission, framing the global mimetic field as the new terrain of ethical life.

- In Section 2, we examined mimetic exclusion as a form of ethical injustice, showing how cultures and communities are denied access to transmission itself.

- In Section 3, we critiqued ethical nationalism and argued that transmission cannot be ethically confined within sovereign boundaries.

- In Section 4, we articulated the right to be repeated as a core aspect of human dignity.

- In Section 5, we proposed mimetic pluralism as a model for ethical cohabitation in a world of overlapping value systems.

- In Section 6, we analysed the role of technics in shaping transmission at scale, showing how infrastructures mediate which values persist and which vanish.

Together, these sections present mimetic humanism as a coherent philosophical orientation: one that is attuned to the flows of influence, the fragility of memory, and the politics of being seen, echoed, and carried forward.

Importantly, mimetic humanism is not an ethics of consensus. It does not presume that all values can or should be reconciled. It accepts that conflict, disagreement, and moral divergence are inevitable. What it demands is that no tradition, no voice, and no value system be rendered structurally unrepeatable, that every person and people have the opportunity to participate in the shaping of shared ethical life.

This vision requires the cultivation of mimetic literacy: the capacity to recognise how values travel, where they distort, and how repetition functions as a vehicle of both harm and hope. Mimetic literacy is not only a cultural skill but a political necessity. It enables us to see when ethical frameworks are being co-opted, when slogans are losing meaning, when traditions are being emptied of depth by their virality. It teaches us to transmit wisely.

It also demands the development of mimetic stewardship. Just as ecological ethics calls for responsible guardianship of the biosphere, so mimetic ethics calls for responsible guardianship of the transmissive sphere, the symbolic, infrastructural, and cultural ecosystems that carry values forward. This is not about curation in the sense of gatekeeping, but in the sense of careful design: ensuring that the systems we build, whether platforms, policies, or pedagogies, do not reduce ethical life to what is immediately legible, marketable, or algorithmically compliant.

From this vantage, the future of ethical life depends on a simple but powerful shift: to stop asking only what is right, and to begin asking what is repeatable with dignity. To make this shift is to begin designing for ethical posterity, to recognise that our actions today shape the values others will inherit tomorrow, not just through intention or outcome, but through the paths we open or close in the mimetic field.

In practical terms, this means:

- Embedding transmissive pluralism into platform and policy design

- Funding cultural and technological projects that support endangered mimetic lineages

- Developing ethical impact assessments that evaluate how values are replicated, not just how systems behave

- Teaching transmission ethics in schools, alongside civics and media literacy

- Reimagining global cooperation not only in terms of trade or diplomacy, but as shared curatorial responsibility

Mimetic humanism does not offer a blueprint for consensus or harmony. It offers something more modest and more urgent: a framework for navigating the fragility, friction, and generativity of transmission in a world where nothing spreads neutrally.

The ethics of the future will not be written solely in constitutions or doctrines. It will be transmitted in fragments, sustained through platforms, rituals, models, habits, and echoes. Mimetic humanism is a call to become conscious of this process, to shape the currents of repetition with care, curiosity, and solidarity.

For in the end, to be human is not only to speak. It is to be repeated, and to help decide what the world will echo next.

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